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ABSTRACT

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus has this motto: “…and whatever a
man knows, whatever is not mere rumbling and roaring that he has heard, can be said in
three words.”
There is a ‘tension’ in the Tractatus between whether or not ethics may be known.
I contend that the motto helps resolve this tension and that therein lies its importance. I
address, inter alia, the origin of this motto, some philosophical influences on
Wittgenstein, the phenomena/noumena distinction and Wittgenstein’s distinction between
‘sense’ and ‘nonsense.’ I, then, treat Wittgenstein’s say/show distinction and how the
Tractatus beckons not to the poverty of silence but to the richness of activity. Next, I
address Wittgenstein’s teaching that an ethical insight is not something cognitively
reasoned but something compassionately felt. Finally, I interpret the motto as beckoning
not to philosophical imponderables but to a principled life.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of presenting philosophy in a laconic literary style doubtless holds
fascination. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, for example, trumpets on its
title page the following motto: “…and whatever a man knows, whatever is not mere
rumbling and roaring that he has heard, can be said in three words.” This motto adduced
by Wittgenstein anticipates his remark in the Preface: “…what can be said at all can be
said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.”1
The motto is divisible into a subject and a predicate. The subject is “…whatever a
man knows” which implies epistemic access to knowledge. The predicate is “can be said
in three words” which carries an implication of a limitation upon meaningful discourse.
Hence, the significance of the motto is that what can be grasped by human knowledge
can be verbalized succinctly. However, such significance itself is ambiguous for the
reason that it could mean either that we humans do not know much at all or, alternatively,
that there is a limitation on how we can express ourselves. I shall consider the former
reading in the earlier sections of my thesis where I contend that the motto adumbrates the
phenomena/noumena distinction and the sense/nonsense distinction. I shall address the

1

D. F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, Ludwig Wittgenstein – Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London:
Routledge, 2007, page 3
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latter reading in the later sections of my thesis in which I contend that the motto operates
on several levels to shed light on the meaning of the text that follows it, one of which is
Wittgenstein’s innovative say/show distinction. Significantly, with respect to
Wittgenstein’s treatment of ethics and whether or not we have epistemic access to ethical
insights I contend in Section VIII that the motto helps resolve that tension and that
therein lies its importance. In the remaining section we see how the motto evokes
associations with Ferdinand Kürnberger, the motto’s author, whose life exemplified the
teaching of the Tractatus.
II. The Motto of the Tractatus
Located on the title page of the Tractatus, the motto reads: “…und alles, was man
weiss, nicht bloss rauschen und brausen gehört hat, lässt sich in drei Worten sagen.
Kürnberger.”2
(1) The significance of a motto. A motto can be a maxim adopted as an
expression of one’s guiding principle as when done by a person or organization. For the
purposes of this paper, however, we shall consider a motto as it applies to inanimate
objects, in particular, literary works: namely, as a short quotation prefixed to a literary
work or to one of its parts, and expressing some idea appropriate to the contents.
Strategically, the positioning of the motto on the title page allows it to give a foretaste of
what is to come. As to the functions of a motto, they include: (1) to provide the reader a
perspective or tone, (2) to specify the meaning of the text that follows, (3) to comment on
that text, and (4) to evoke associations with the motto’s author or her writings.
2

The Pears and McGuinness translation is: “…and whatever a man knows, whatever is not mere rumbling
or roaring that he has heard, can be said in three words.” Title page of the Tractatus.
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(2) The origin of this motto. The words chosen by Wittgenstein for the
Tractatus’ motto first appeared in “Das Denkmalsetzen in der Opposition” published in
the Deutsche Zeitung, late autumn 1873 by Ferdinand Kürnberger. Ferdinand Kürnberger
was born in Vienna on July 3, 1821 and died in Munich on October 14, 1879.3
Kürnberger was an Austrian writer who utilized more than one medium: he
published both in book form and in newspapers. He, apparently, made quite a reputation
for himself as the author of editorial-type articles in the Vienna newspapers called
feuilletons.4 The French verb feuilleter comes from the root word for ‘leaf’ and means
‘to skim (a book).’ Such articles appeared on the editorial page but below the line and
were known to be satirical in nature. An outspoken man, Kürnberger had been called the
‘Stammvater’ or founding father of Viennese critical journalism and was likened to
ancient Rome’s Cato for his pursuit of truth. Kürnberger is remembered in history more
for participation in the Austrian Revolution of 1848 and in the Dresden Rebellion of 1849
than for his literary works. Significantly, he was forced to flee Austria in 1848 and was
jailed for his involvement in the Dresden Rebellion of the following year.5 (It is
remarkable that the author of the motto that Wittgenstein chose for his second book,
Philosophical Investigations, Johann Nestroy, also was jailed more than once for his
political activism.6)
As remarked in Wittgenstein’s Vienna,

3

http://www.bookrags.com/biography/ferdinand-kuernberger-dlb (August 2008)
ibid.
5
http://original.britannica.com/eb/article-9046480/Ferdinand-Kuernberger(August 2008)
6
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-Nestroy.html (September 2009)
4
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Wittgenstein himself did nothing to cut himself off from the wider literary and
cultural traditions with which he was familiar in his youth. His comparative
ignorance of the older philosophical classics was counterbalanced by rich and
varied familiarity with the main figures on the German and Austrian scene. And
the mottoes he chose for his two chief books were taken from authors who could
hardly have been more typically Viennese—Kürnberger for the Tractatus,
Nestroy for the Investigations.7
While we do not know the full nature and extent of the influence of Kürnberger on
Wittgenstein suffice it to say that Wittgenstein was familiar with the reputation of
Kürnberger as an activist and outspoken critic of civil authority.
Kürnberger’s 1873 article contains a scenario in which he poses a question to a
semi-educated person and the same question to a moderately (or well) educated person,
receiving two different answers. Kürnberger’s question has to do with the difference
between ancient and modern art.
Kürnberger writes:
If I ask a semi-educated man: What is the difference between antiquity and
modern, between classical and romantic art, he may answer in great confusion:
Sir, this question conjures up entire realms of possibilities. This is a matter for
entire books and Winter Semesters at university.
If, on the other hand, I ask the same question of a man of moderately or
advanced learning, I will invariably receive the answer: Sir, this can be stated in
three words. The arts of antiquity issued forth from the body, the arts of
modernity arise from the soul. The arts of antiquity were therefore sculptural,
while the arts of modernity are lyrical, musical, artistic—in brief—romantic.8
It is significant that Kürnberger introduces the reader to his expression ‘in three
words’ in the foregoing passage. The reader can tell that by such expression Kürnberger
means to express the idea of something that is ‘brief’ and ‘to-the-point.’ This is so
7

Allan Janik and Stephen Toulman, Wittgenstein’s Vienna, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973,
Introduction, p.27
8
Translation from German, Literarische Herzenssachen Reflexionem und Kritiken, Deutsche Zeitung,
1873, pages 339-341
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because the semi-educated person was overwhelmed and replied that the answer to that
question would take a long time to assemble and narrate. Perhaps, the semi-educated
person was incapable of giving a succinct, correct answer for the reason that he did not
understand the actual difference between ancient art and modern art.
The well educated person in Kürnberger’s essay summarizes his answer
succinctly by a contrast between the more physical nature of statuary of the ancients
which emphasized the beauty of the human body and the more lyrical nature of romantic
art of the then-contemporary times which emphasized the beauty of the human mind.
Kürnberger continues:
Bravo! Thus it is possible for entire worlds of ideas, if one truly masters them, to
fit within a nutshell, and everything that one knows that hasn’t been dedicated
solely to rushing about and shouting can be summed up in three words. And one
more thing: If that is in fact the case, then why are we so insistent in setting up
monuments to modernity?9
Thus, the reader is given by Kürnberger a repetition of his chosen phrase ‘in three words’
in the succeeding passage and, of course, it is this passage that Wittgenstein chooses as
the Tractatus’ motto. It is in this context that Kürnberger gives the reader the visual
image ‘in a nutshell’ to explain what he meant by ‘in three words.’ Kürnberger
emphasizes that a true grasp of the knowledge of ancient and modern art permitted its
knower to be succinct in his response. The moral of the story, so to speak, is that
profound concepts could be stated briefly.
What, then, is the significance of the Tractatus’ motto? It is that what can be
grasped through human knowledge can be verbalized succinctly. How and why is that
9

ibid., page 340

Knoten, Thomas Patrick, 2009, UMSL, p. 8
true? It is true because (1) there is an implied limit to what human knowledge can attain
and (2) there is an implied limitation on how human beings can verbalize what we know.
We shall consider the former below in Section IV and V and the latter in Section VI to
IX.
III. Some Philosophical Influences on Wittgenstein’s Thought
In order to make the connection between the motto and the text of the Tractatus
let us consider some of the philosophical influences on Wittgenstein’s thought.
Georg Henrik von Wright who knew Wittgenstein at Cambridge later wrote the
‘Biographical Sketch’ of Wittgenstein which was published in Norman Malcolm’s 1958
Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir. Professor von Wright remembered that Wittgenstein
had personally told him that he (Wittgenstein) had read Schopenhauer’s Die Welt als
Wille und Vorstellung in his youth and that his first philosophy was a Schopenhauerian
epistemological idealism.10 Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) is in the Kantian tradition
and, of course, made original contributions to philosophy.
Barbara Hannan makes the case that Wittgenstein was substantially influenced by
Schopenhauer in a passage in her book:
The Tractatus is filled with images and ideas that obviously have their origin in
Schopenhauer’s work. See particularly 5.6 – 5.641 and 6.423 – 7. These images

10

Georg Henrik von Wright, ‘Biographical Sketch’ in Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958, page 5. This is in harmony with The Story of Philosophy where
author Bryan Magee wrote: “For the rest of his [Wittgenstein’s] life he accepted a view of total reality that
saw it as divided between, on the one hand, a realm of which we could have no conceptual understanding
and about which we could therefore say nothing, and on the other hand this phenomenal world of our
experience, which we could indeed talk about and attempt to understand. Intelligible philosophy, he always
thought, had to confine itself to the world we could talk about, on pain of becoming meaningless nonsense
if it stepped across the borderline.” Bryan Magee, The Story of Philosophy, New York: Dorling
Kindersley, 2001, page 202
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and ideas evidently took root in Wittgenstein’s mind when he read WWR [The
World as Will and Representation] in his youth.11
Accordingly, let us examine some examples from Schopenhauer’s philosophy that
appealed to the so-called “early Wittgenstein”, namely, ‘the eye’, ‘riddle’, ‘ladder’ and
‘seeing the world aright.’
Schopenhauer asserts, respecting the ‘self’, that the subject of representations is a
single consciousness in which many diverse experiences of objects are united.12 One of
his favorite metaphorical images for it is the eye that looks out on the world but cannot
see itself. 13 Significantly, in section 5.633, Wittgenstein uses the image of a human eye
and writes, in part: “But really you do not see the eye.”
Metaphysics according to Schopenhauer consists in attempting to find the
“solution to the riddle of the world.”14 Wittgenstein uses the term ‘riddle’ twice in the
Tractatus, declaring at 6.4312 that: “The solution to the riddle of life in space and time
lies outside space and time.” In the subsection that follows I shall address two images
borrowed by Wittgenstein from Schopenhauer relative to ethics.
Two images, ‘the ladder’ and ‘seeing the world aright’ both appear in the
Tractatus’ penultimate section, 6.54. The first of these images is traceable to
Schopenhauer according to Hans-Johann Glock in his article, “Schopenhauer and

11

Barbara Hannan, The Riddle of the World – A Reconsideration of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009, page 16, Footnote 26
12
Christopher Janaway, Schopenhauer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, page 42
13
ibid., page 42
14
ibid., p.18

Knoten, Thomas Patrick, 2009, UMSL, p. 10
Wittgenstein – Language as Representation and Will.” 15 The ladder image was first used
by Schopenhauer and then put to use in the enigmatic penultimate section of the
Tractatus, which provides, in part: “(He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he
has climbed up it.)” Glock, then, turns his attention to the ethical posture of one’s
attitude to the world and finds a fruitful comparison between Schopenhauer and
Wittgenstein. Glock writes: “For both Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein, the good life does
not involve any imposition of my will on the course of events, but an attitude—‘seeing
the world aright.’” 16
Schopenhauer was among the first of the 19th century philosophers to accept that,
at its core, the universe is not a rational place.17 In The Fourfold Root of the Principle of
Sufficient Cause, Schopenhauer critically examines the disposition to assume that what is
real is what is rational.18 Schopenhauer’s originality resides in his conception of the Will
as being devoid of rationality or intellect.19 Life requires us to face a world that is endless
striving and blind impulse with no end in view, lawless, absolutely free, entirely selfdetermining and almighty.20 In effect, Schopenhauer’s metaphysics determines his
ethics; the result is a world that is indifferent to us but in which we have an ethics of
compassion for fellow travelers to the grave. Hannan, cited above, continues her
description of Schopenhauerian ethics: “Since nothing can be justified outside the
15

Hans-Johann Glock, “Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein-Language as Representation and Will”, ed.
Christopher Janaway, The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999, pages 434 -442
16
ibid., p.442
17
Robert Wicks, “Arthur Schopenhauer” , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, page 1,
http://www.plato.stanford.edu/ (November 2007)
18
ibid., page 5
19
ibid., page 10
20
ibid., page 12
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structures imposed by reason, this mystical ethical insight, and the way people attain it,
must remain, ultimately, a mystery. It is felt, not reasoned.”21 As we shall see in Section
VIII, below, Wittgenstein executes his own turn from the cognitive to the non-cognitive
regarding ethics.
Another respected American philosopher, Max Black, whose A Companion to
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is iconic, writes about Schopenhauer’s influence on the author
of the Tractatus: “Parts of the book date back to 1913 and some of the concluding
remarks on ethics and the will may have been composed still earlier, when Wittgenstein
admired Schopenhauer.”22 As noted above Professor von Wright was told by
Wittgenstein that his first philosophy was a Schopenhauerian epistemological idealism.
Janaway considers this matter to be well-settled. He writes that
Wittgenstein … did not come across Schopenhauer’s works in an academic
setting. He read them as part of the stock of ideas with which Viennese high
society was furnished…. In fact, not to have read Schopenhauer would have been
the odd thing for a young person from a cultured family such as Wittgenstein’s.23
As remembered by Professor von Wright, above, and as attested to by the
historian of philosophy, Magee, above, the early Wittgenstein existed in the KantianSchopenhauerian tradition of the phenomena/noumena distinction. This tradition
accepted that it is an imperfect world in which we live, that, although we may wish to
have epistemic access to the noumenal world, we are restricted to access to the world of

21

op. cit., Hannan, page 92-93
Max Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1964, page 1
23
op. cit., Janaway, Schopenhauer, page 104-105
22
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phenomena. Hence, despite a desire for a thorough knowledge of reality we are limited to
the knowledge of what we perceive through the five senses.
In the section that follows I shall consider how the motto adumbrates the
phenomena/noumena distinction that imbues the Tractatus.
IV. The Phenomena/ Noumena Distinction.
This phenomena/noumena distinction and the limit to what human knowledge can
attain are reflected in the Tractatus.24
In 4.113, we see that “Philosophy sets limits to the much disputed sphere of
natural science.” At 4.114 we see that philosophy: “must set limits to what can be
thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought. It must set limits to what cannot be
thought by working outwards through what can be thought.”
For Wittgenstein, then, the application of the techniques of philosophical analysis
to natural science has the wholesome effects of clarifying and elucidating scientific
thoughts, up to the point of acknowledging the limits of knowledge. Philosophy, when
put into practice, disciplines the thinker to stay within the realm of natural science, i.e.
what can be known, on pain of sliding into meaningless, nonsensical speculation if one
crosses the borderline into what cannot be thought. The aforementioned sections of the
Tractatus clearly reflect that a true philosopher is not only justified but affirmatively
required to adhere to the evidence and metrics of the scientific method, the realm of
phenomena.

24

op. cit., Pears and McGuinness, See 4.113, 4.114, 4.115, 4.116 and 6.53.
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Wittgenstein continues with his following aphorism about philosophy: “It will
signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said.” (4.115) and
“Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly. Everything that can be put
into words can be put clearly.” (4.116)
For Wittgenstein, then, philosophy has the felicitous result of signifying what
speculation to avoid by pointing out the fruitful field of natural science. The
aforementioned sections of the Tractatus reflect that a true philosopher will abhor the
conjecture and speculation associated with the noumenal realm and will warm to his
work with a zeal for clarity and precision in her work that will withstand scientific
scrutiny and will pass scientific muster. This is so because the subject matter of natural
science is amenable to study, is intelligible to the thinker and is susceptible of a reasoned
account. Further, what the thinker comprehends in thought can be articulated and clearly
so.25
As the bottom brick in his bag, so to speak, near the conclusion of his treatise
Wittgenstein opines in 6.53:
25

As pointed out in my Introduction, the motto of the Tractatus hyperbolically praises
succinctness when it trumpets that whatever a man knows can be said in three words.
Deftly Wittgenstein echoes and reinforces that sentiment in Section 5.4541 which
provides, in pertinent part:
Men have always had a presentiment that there must be a realm in which the
answers to questions are symmetrically combined—a priori—to form a self-contained
system. A realm subject to the law: Simplex sigillum veri.
A free translation would be ‘Simplicity is the guarantor of truth.’ In section
5.4541, Wittgenstein can be understood to mean the value of simplicity as an explanatory
power is the persuasiveness of its lack of artifice and fraud. In science, as we know, there
is the principle of parsimony under which the hypothesis proposed as a solution is best
when it requires the fewest assumptions of the scientific community.
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The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing
except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science---i.e. something that
has nothing to do with philosophy….
In the section that follows I shall address how the motto supports Wittgenstein’s
impulse to distinguish sense from nonsense through a regimentation of language and
focus on the propositions of natural science.
V. The Distinction between ‘Sense’ and ‘Nonsense.’
Wittgenstein employs three technical vocabulary words in the Tractatus, namely,
‘sense’ (Sinn), ‘senseless’ (Sinnlos) and ‘nonsense’ (Unsinnig).
He first uses the term ‘sense’ in Section 2.221 as follows: “What a picture
represents is its sense.” By way of commentary he immediately adds in Section 2.222:
“The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity.”
Then, in contrast to ‘sense’ Wittgenstein yields up his technical use of ‘senseless’,
which for him means lacking a sense or in the state of being without a sense. At Section
5.132, he writes: “‘Laws of inference’, which are supposed to justify inferences, as in the
works of Frege and Russell, have no sense, and would be superfluous.” An example of
the foregoing would be a logical proposition, such as, a tautology about which there is
more later in Section VI, below.
Third, and finally, as to the technical term ‘nonsense’, as so concisely put by the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article, “Ludwig Wittgenstein”, “Nonsense, as
opposed to senselessness, is encountered when a proposition is even more devoid of
meaning, when it transcends the bounds of sense.” Especially instructive is Section 4.003
which provides:
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Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not
false but nonsencical. Consequently, we cannot give any answers of this kind, but
can only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and
questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our
language.
(They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less
identical than the beautiful.)
And it is not surprising that our deepest problems are not problems at all.
We know, with confidence, from his Preface, that Wittgenstein’s self-proclaimed
aim of the Tractatus is to “draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the
expression of thoughts:….” Further, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article
mentioned above goes on to conclude that Wittgenstein’s aim in the Tractatus was “to
find the limits of world, thought and language; in other words, to distinguish between
sense and nonsense.” Such a view of the Tractatus, the traditional view, has it that
Wittgenstein’s aim was to silence metaphysical conjecture by presenting his analysis of
sense versus nonsense, including his theory that makes clear what can and cannot be said.
This traditional view of the Tractatus jibes well with the conclusion contained within the
Motto.
Taken together, what seems clear from the above-cited passages is that
Wittgenstein advocates a disciplined, rigorous approach to learning, one that realizes its
limitations. If, as Wittgenstein teaches, we humans are limited to natural science in our
ability to formulate meaningful thoughts, then, comparatively speaking, our universe of
learning must be smaller than if there were no such limitation upon us. Stated differently,
if, as Wittgenstein teaches, we are limited to the realm of natural science, then we in our
human condition cannot really know very much. What we can know is most assuredly
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not absolute but, rather, qualified. What we can know is only that which is within the
realm of natural science and not otherwise. The Tractatus’ motto (“whatever a man
knows…can be said in three words.”) exemplifies that idea.
Next, let us consider one example of something that Wittgenstein posited as
falling outside the limits of what we can know. Characteristically, Wittgenstein shunned
pronouncements concerning ethical imperatives telling us: “So too it is impossible for
there to be propositions of ethics.” (6.42). Given that language marks the limits of our
world and what can be known, we have evidence to think that ethics falls outside of what
can be known.
I corresponded with Professor Victor Rodych who has the honor of being the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy author of the 2007 article, “Wittgenstein’s
Philosophy of Mathematics.” On the connection of the Tractatus’ motto to ethics,
Professor Rodych writes:
Still the foregoing combination of the Preface and the motto does obviously apply
to ethical pseudo-propositions. We cannot know such a ‘proposition’ to be true
because they are not genuine propositions; one does not make an assertion with a
declarative sentence of that form. (Correspondence, August 28- September 2,
2008)

Rodych emphasizes that just as the motto brings our attention to certain propositions as
legitimate (those of natural science), it also rules out certain propositions (the ethical and
the mystical) as illegitimate.
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In the section that follows I shall address how the motto reflects Wittgenstein’s
say/show distinction and the way it leaves room for Wittgenstein’s view of ethics as
ineffable but still important.
VI. Wittgenstein’s Say/Show Distinction.
A tantalizing paradox in the Tractatus is that the same author who claims that
what can be known can be said succinctly is the very author who manages to say
appreciably much spread across the eighty plus printed pages of his treatise. Bertrand
Russell did not let this fact go unremarked in his Introduction to the Tractatus where, in
two places on pages xxiii-xxiv, he gently chides Wittgenstein on this point. Russell
writes: “What causes hesitation is the fact that, after all, Mr Wittgenstein manages to say
a good deal about what cannot be said….” and, second, “The whole subject of ethics, for
example, is placed by Mr Wittgenstein in the mystical, inexpressible region.
Nevertheless, he is capable of conveying his ethical opinions.” I do concur with
Russell’s points and I maintain that we, Wittgenstein included, are all able to express a
great deal. Let us consider, next, the force and justice of Wittgenstein’s position on this
point, however, in light of his famous ‘say/show distinction.’
In his ‘Biographical Sketch’ of Wittgenstein mentioned above, Professor von
Wright makes it clear that a main ingredient of the Tractatus is the introduction of
Wittgenstein’s doctrine of that which cannot be said, but can only be shown.
Wittgenstein’s teaching is that we use propositions in the form of sentences in language
to express ourselves but language has built-in limitations that mask and disguise the
underlying logical form. As treated above, Wittgenstein held that we may say meaningful
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things in natural science but when we venture beyond natural science our
pronouncements become pseudo-propositions of no value and inherently meaningless.
Nevertheless, even though certain things may not be said, it is still possible for things to
be shown.
Consider an especially simple kind of logical truth, the tautology. A proposition in
the form of ‘p v –p’ is an instance of the principle known as the law of the excluded
middle. Every instance of this principle is a tautology. At Section 4.461 of the Tractatus
Wittgenstein wrote:
Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they
say nothing.
A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a
contradiction is true on no condition.
Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.26
In Section 4.0031 we learn, apparently via Bertrand Russell, that human language
disguises the underlying logical form of a proposition. In Section 4.022 we learn that a
proposition shows how things stand if it is true. Accordingly, what a proposition shows is
a possible state of affairs. In order for a statement to say something it is required that such
statement be either true or false in accordance with the reality of the world.
Not so, however, for a proposition of logic, such as, ‘If p, then q.’ A proposition
of logic is a device that may be used over and over and has no truth value. It can show,
but not say.

26

There is a string of relevant citations to the Tractatus that bears on the limitation on how humans can
verbalize what we know and on the show/say distinction. op. cit., Pears and McGuinness, See: 4.0031;
4.022; 4.0312; 4.115; 4.12; 4.121; 4.1211, 4.1212, together with 6.1, 6.11 and 6.12.
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Additionally, in section 4.0312 we learn that logical constants do not represent. In
Section 4.115 we learn that philosophy will signify what cannot be said, by presenting
clearly what can be said. Hence, in due course, in Sections 4.12 through 4.1212 we learn,
inter alia, that propositions show the logical form of reality, that they do so by displaying
it, and that what can be shown, cannot be said.
Finally, with respect to the foregoing string of citations, 6.1 provides: “The
propositions of logic are tautologies.” and is followed by “Therefore the propositions of
logic say nothing. (They are analytic propositions.)” (6.11) Wittgenstein, then,
emphasizes in 6.12: “The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the
formal—logical—properties of language and the world.”
Accordingly, notwithstanding the limit to what human knowledge can attain and,
further, notwithstanding its implication that what we can say is very limited, it remains
true that the form of our expressions manages to communicate a great deal. One
commentator on the foregoing sections calls their teaching the ‘showing doctrine’, which
is said to be manifested via the notion of ‘logical space’ and presents a sharp dichotomy
between what we can express and what we can only manifest.27 Significantly, the
commentator concludes:
The tension between showing and saying is salient already in the motto of the
Tractatus where Wittgenstein quotes Kurnberger’s dictum “…and whatever a
man knows, whatever is not mere rumbling and roaring that he has heard, can be
said in three words.” Here the tension is between the multiple content of
knowledge and the severely limited amount of meaningful words that can express
27

Shlomy Maulem, “Language as a Twofaced Phenomenon: Wittgenstein’s Doctrine of Showing in the
Light of Heraclitus’ Concept of Logos” , Topicos Revisita de Filosofia (Mexico) (2001),
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it, so that these three words must manifest much more than they can express; it
comes out that singularity encloses generality. Such a tension between the
particular and generality underlies Wittgenstein’s ‘showing doctrine’, as will be
demonstrated hereby via the concept of ‘logical space’, which is one of the key
notions of the Tractatus.28
In this passage we see the idea that the motto embodies the say/show distinction in its
declaration that everything a man knows can be expressed in “three words.” Rather than
consider this from the perspective of the poverty of what can known, we can now
consider the motto from the perspective of the power of our language to show a great deal
of what cannot explicitly be said.
Furthermore, this above suggestion brings us to a different perspective on ethics.
In fact Wittgenstein does not abjure the word ‘ethics’ and that word is expressly used
near the end of the Tractatus. As noted earlier, in 6.42 he expands upon a point already
made above by adding: “So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.” However, immediately following is
6.421 which provides: “It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is
transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.).” It seems that ethics falls
under the category of what cannot be said but can be shown.
A concrete explanation of Wittgenstein’s fascination with the so-called
ineffability of ethics is contained in an exchange of letters between Engelmann and
Wittgenstein. On April 4, 1917, Engelmann wrote enclosing the poem “Count Eberhard’s
Hawthorn” by the poet Uhland. It is a short, 28-line poem, which happens to be exactly
twice the length of the standard British sonnet. Uhland, in that short plot of ground,
28
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manages to recount the story of a soldier who brought home from war with him a sprig
cut from a Hawthorn bush which he, then, planted at home. Much later, in his old age, the
veteran sits beneath the shade of the flourishing adult Hawthorn tree, which serves as
poignant reminder of his youth. Five days after having received that letter Wittgenstein,
on April 9, 1917, wrote a thank-you letter to Engelmann in which he praised the poem as
“really magnificent.” Wittgenstein enthused: “And this is how it is: if only you do not try
to utter what is unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be –
unutterably—contained in what has been uttered.”
This collateral document helps to ‘cash out’ Wittgenstein’s position on
ineffability. Certainly, his letter, on its face, communicates that a poet is able, by
indirection, to create an emotional reaction in her reader. Uhland’s poetry succeeded in
creating a mood, touching a chord within Wittgenstein.29
In the section that follows I shall show how the motto and the Preface of the
Tractatus and the concluding line of the Tractatus point to a life characterized by
activity.
VII. The Tractatus Beckons not to the Poverty of Silence but to the Richness of Activity.
29

‘The lunatic, the lover, and the poet
Are of imagination all compact:
One sees more devils than vast hell can hold,
That is , the madman: the lover , all as frantic,
Sees Helen’s beauty in a brow of Egypt:
The poet’s eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to
heaven;
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen
Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.”
William Shakespeare, A Midsummer’s Night Dream, Act V, Scene I
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It is crystal clear that Wittgenstein composed his treatise, the Tractatus, with a
hierarchical structure with main propositions numbered 1 through 7. What this means for
Proposition 7 is that, although it is terse and often read as blended into the aphorisms of
Section 6, it is, in actuality, the opening of a brand new, and main, section of the
Tractatus.
Just what is the meaning of Proposition 7? Is it in the sphere of logic…or more in
the sphere of ethics, in keeping with its next preceding neighbors in Section 6?
In his biography of Wittgenstein, Ray Monk writes: “The famous last sentence of
the book-‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’- expresses both a
logico-philosophical truth and an ethical precept.” 30
Similarly, in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus –A Dialectical Interpretation, Matthew B.
Ostrow opines:
And that is to say that to “go on” with the task of the Tractatus is ultimately just
to acknowledge the “must” in the text’s final remark – “Whereof one cannot
speak, thereof one must remain silent” (TLP 7)-as the mark not of logical
necessity but of ethical obligation.”31
Significantly, the Tractatus contains a lengthy and instructive section on the
nature and function of correct philosophy. Section 4.112 reads:
Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.
A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.
Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions’, but rather in the
clarification of propositions.
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to
make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.
30
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One of the important insights of the Tractatus, according to the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy article cited above, is the idea that philosophy is not a
doctrine, and hence should not be approached dogmatically. In fact, for Wittgenstein,
who worked as a full-time schoolmaster in Austria after World War I, philosophy was the
enterprise of living life each day.
Cora Diamond, in her article, “Ethics, Imagination and the Method of
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”, posits a useful technique for interpreting the Tractatus. She
accepts Wittgenstein’s pronouncement that his treatise is not a textbook and, further, that
there is a kind of reading that it requires. She goes on to visualize a ‘frame’ of the work
consisting of the Tractatus’ Preface and its closing sentences. In his Preface, of course,
Wittgenstein flatly states: “The whole sense of the book may be summed up in the
following words: what can said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about
we must pass over in silence.” He, then, in the next sentence writes out the aim of his
book respecting the drawing of limits to the expression of thoughts.
To complete the description of Diamond’s frame, however, requires us to take
note of the closing sentences of the Tractatus. Here is where a misconstrual can and does
occur. The antepenultimate sentence of the Tractatus begins Section 6.54 with its
startling revelation by the author that his propositions are ‘nonsensical’ and, further, in
the penultimate sentence, that the reader must transcend them in order to see the world
aright. For some readers the spell cast by those two revelations lingers on to impact the
meaning of the next main section of the Tractatus, which consists entirely of one
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proposition, namely, the final sentence of the Tractatus: “7 What we cannot speak about
we must pass over in silence.”
I am impressed by Ostrow’s insight:
Given the emphasis of so much recent literature on 6.54, one might well suppose
that this remark was in fact the text’s final statement that Wittgenstein leaves us
with his pronouncement of the nonsensicality of everything philosophical. In fact,
though, the Tractatus ends with propositions 7’s call for silence….Wittgenstein’s
claims, it would seem, find their real fulfillment not in what we say, but in what
we do.32
Accordingly, interpreting the last line of the Tractatus as not leading to the
poverty of silence but to the richness of activity, arguably, is foreshadowed in the
Tractatus’ Preface which itself is anticipated by the motto.
In the next section of my thesis I shall show how Wittgenstein, with homage to
Schopenhauer, teaches how one has access to an ethical insight.
VIII. Wittgenstein Teaches that an Ethical Insight is not Something that is Cognitively
Reasoned but Something Compassionately Felt.
Under Section VI above, I conclude that one of the Tractatus’ teachings is that
language marks the limits of what can be known and that ethics falls outside of what can
be known. A tension is created later in Section VI when I conclude that even though
certain things, such as ethics, may not be said, it is, nevertheless, possible for them to be
shown. Can ethics, according to the Tractatus, be known or not? How does one resolve
that tension?
As indicated in Section III above, Schopenhauer is in the Kantian tradition and,
according to both Kant and Schopenhauer, total reality is divisible into what is
32

ibid., page 13-14

Knoten, Thomas Patrick, 2009, UMSL, p. 25
susceptible of being known and what is not. By construing the Tractatus, a document
written by an Austrian in his native German language, in light of Schopenhauer’s
substantial oeuvre, one arrives at a world view that reality is divisible into what can be
known and what cannot, into what is rational and what is not, and into what is cognitive
and what is non-cognitive.
The pessimism of Schopenhauer when he looked out on a state of nature that was
“red in tooth and claw”, on a world of blind impulse devoid of rationality and on a cold,
indifferent universe was not lost on the young and brooding Ludwig. He used
Schopenhauerian idealism as his point of departure and contributed to posterity such
novel and philosophically-freighted aphorisms as “How things are in the world is a matter
of complete indifference for what is higher.” (Section 6.432); “It is not how things are in
the world that is mystical, but that it exists. (Section 6.44); and “There are indeed things
that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is
mystical.” (Section 6.522)
Significantly, according to Glock, Wittgenstein characterizes mysticism by
reference to two features:
1. It not only lies beyond all possible knowledge, but is also incommunicable or
ineffable, something ‘which cannot be put into words’ but ‘shows itself’….
2. It is a feeling of union with God or the universe, a ‘consciousness of the
identity of one’s own inner being with that of all things, or with the kernel of the
world.’33
My contention is that the perceived tension between having no epistemic access to
ethics and how ethics is made manifest is not a real tension but an apparent one.
33
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Wittgenstein, like Schopenhauer before him, executes a turn from the cognitive to the
non-cognitive. Wittgenstein never purports to be able to know ethical commandments or
to have meaningful discourse about such. Instead, his ethics is the result of his
confrontation with the indifference of the universe.34
Wittgenstein saw combat in World War I. His biographer Monk records that
while Wittgenstein was at the battlefront, from March to May, 1916, he was able to write
little on logic in his diary-type notebooks. Significantly, an entry in his notebook from
that time period found its way unchanged into the Tractatus which we now read as
Sections 6.371 and 6.372:
The whole conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called
laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.
Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something
inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages.
In the ensuing months the combat intensified in Wittgenstein’s sector under the
assault of the Brasilov Offensive in June, 1916. It was precisely at this time that the
nature of Wittgenstein’s work changed, Monk tells us.35 On June 11, 1916, Wittgenstein
recorded in his notebook the question: “What do I know about God and the purpose of
life?” Monk concluded that it was as if, for Wittgenstein, “…the personal and the
philosophical became fused; ethics and logic—two aspects of the ‘duty to oneself’—had
34

Joseph Conrad is one writer who was strongly influenced by Schopenhauer. A friend of Conrad’s was the
American writer Stephen Crane who, in his short story The Open Boat writes about sailors undergoing
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Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1963, pages 19-22
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finally come together, not merely as two aspects of the same personal task, but as two
parts of the same philosophical work.”36
When Wittgenstein writes about God he does so in a metaphorical manner, that is,
equating the meaning of life with “the meaning of the world, which we can call God.”37
We are able to construe the Tractatus in light of his “A Lecture on Ethics” that
Wittgenstein delivered to the Heretics Society, Cambridge University in November,
1929.38 In it he rehearses for his live audience “the experience of feeling absolutely safe.”
He equates this feeling with the state of mind in which one is inclined to say ‘I am safe,
nothing can injure me whatever happens.’ He, then, explains that people use an
allegorical explanation for this feeling by describing the experience of absolute safety by
saying that “we feel safe in the hands of God.” Wittgenstein, in recognizing and
accepting his fate as an insignificant part of the greater universe, is comfortable with a
turn from the cognitive to non-cognitive feeling for his explanation of such an ethical
insight.
Hence, there is no fatal flaw in the Tractatus with respect to its mentioning of
ethics. Yes, Bertrand Russell had gently chided Wittgenstein for appearing to try to have
it both ways, not being able to talk about ethics and yet managing to say quite a lot on the
topic. But understood as a non-cognitive experience of the indifference of the vast, cold
universe toward any and all human beings there is no self-contradiction present. For
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Wittgenstein, in the final analysis, ethics is something that he felt, not something about
which he reasoned.
IX. The Motto Beckons not to Philosophical Imponderables but to a Principled Life.
The motto is similar to the treatise which it precedes: both have subtexts, both are
intentionally obscure while otherwise leaving access open to ethical insights. With
respect to the subtext of the motto it is, indeed, helpful in resolving whether or not ethics,
according to the Tractatus, can be known. Wittgenstein almost certainly invested a great
deal of thought and selectivity into his choice of a motto for the Tractatus. Wittgenstein
chose a non-philosopher, Kürnberger, who lived a principled life and was willing to
undergo imprisonment for acting on his convictions concerning the Dresden Rebellion of
1849. Wittgenstein, thereby, paid homage to a personage who exemplified the teaching of
the Tractatus which beckons one to progress from the poverty of silence to the wealth of
activity. The affirmative statement of the motto is pregnant with a negative implication.
The negative implication present is that where words fail, activity begins. Not to the
poverty of silence does the motto beckon but, rather to the richness of a life of principled
action. Hence, by affixing Kürnberger’s name to the title page the motto evokes
associations with Kürnberger’s life. By honoring him thus, Wittgenstein demonstrates the
connection between the motto’s negative implication and the Tractatus’ admonition to
abandon philosophical imponderables for a commitment to a life lived in the present,
therefore, timelessly, and lived in accordance with an ethics of compassion, therefore,
lived well.
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X. Conclusion
We have undertaken an analysis of the motto of the Tractatus and have
demonstrated the connection of the import of the motto with the cited passages of the
Tractatus.39 The motto’s subject (“whatever a man knows…”) implies epistemic access
to knowledge. The motto’s predicate (“…can be said in three words.”), however, alerts us
to a limitation upon meaningful discourse. The motto is facially ambiguous for the reason
that it is susceptible of two readings. First, it could mean that we humans do not know
much at all. Or, second, it could mean that there is a limitation on how we can express
ourselves. Under the first reading we have seen how the motto adumbrates the
phenomena/noumena distinction and the sense/nonsense distinction that imbue the
Tractatus. Under the second reading we have also seen the way in which the motto
reflects Wittgenstein’s say/show distinction and the way in which it leaves room for
Wittgenstein’s view of ethics as ineffable but still important. Additionally, we have seen
how the admonition in Section 7 of the Tractatus beckons not to the poverty of silence
but to the richness of activity. Further, we have seen that Wittgenstein, with homage to
Schopenhauer, teaches that an ethical insight is something that is not cognitively
reasoned but something that is compassionately felt. Finally, we have seen that, by
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negative implication, the motto beckons the reader not to philosophical imponderables
but to a principled life, which when lived in the present, is its own reward.
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